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The role of contingent contexts in formulating relations between properties
of systems at di¤erent descriptive levels is addressed. Based on the distinction
between necessary and su¢ cient conditions for interlevel relations, a comprehen-
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1 Introduction
A basic strategy for the scientic description of any system, physical or oth-
erwise, is to specify its state and the properties associated with that state,
and then introduce their evolution in terms of dynamical laws. This strategy
presupposes that the boundary of a system can be dened with respect to its en-
vironment, although such a denition is often problematic. If it can be achieved,
there is usually more than one possibility for specifying states and properties.
The fact that states and properties can be formally and rigorously dened in
fundamental physical theories distinguishes the structure of such theories as
particularly transparent. A paradigmatic framework for a fundamental theory
in present-day physics is quantum theory.
The situation is di¤erent in physical theories which are not regarded as
fundamental (such as thermodynamics), or in descriptive approaches beyond
physics (such as chemistry, biology or psychology). Though states and associ-
ated properties are often precisely dened in such theories, these descriptions are
typically considered as less fundamental and as lacking the compact structure
of fundamental theories. This circumstance provides one (though not the only)
motivation for attempts to relate descriptions of systems, which are not funda-
mental in the sense mentioned above, to descriptions which are fundamental in
this sense. The usual and (often too) simple framework in which corresponding
relations are typically formulated is that of a hierarchy of descriptions. In a
hierarchical picture (which can be rened in terms of more complicated net-
works of descriptions) there are higher-level and lower-level descriptions. More
fundamental theories are taken to refer to lower levels in the hierarchy.
In such a simple framework, reduction and emergence are relations between
di¤erent levels of descriptions of a system, its states and properties, or the
(dynamical) laws characterizing their behavior. In the philosophical literature,
the usual guiding idea behind reductionist approaches is to reducehigher-level
features to lower-level features. In contrast, emergentist approaches emphasize
the higher-level features by stressing the irreducibility of (some of) their aspects
to lower levels. In this way, the emergence of features at higher levels is related to
the emergence of novelty. Under the strong inuence of positivist thinking in the
rst half of the 20th century, many philosophers enthusiastically welcomed the
rapid and successful development of quantum theory as the ultimate justication
for an entirely reductionist approach. For example, Reichenbach maintained
that today it is possible to say that chemistry is a part of physics, just as much
as thermodynamics or the theory of electricity(1978, p. 129), and Oppenheim
and Putnam argued for the possibility that science may one day be reduced
to microphysics (in the sense in which chemistry seems today to be reduced to
it...)(1958, p. 35). Or consider Nagels claim that certain parts of nineteenth
century chemistry (and perhaps the whole of this science) is reducible to post-
1925 physics(1961, p. 362).
Such statements are not limited to philosophers. Dirac wrote that ... the
underlying physical laws necessary for the mathematical theory of a large part
of physics and the whole of chemistry are thus completely known, and the
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di¢ culty is only that the exact application of these laws leads to equations
much too complicated to be soluble (1929, p. 714). And Feynman et al.
celebrated the Schrödinger equation as ... one of the great triumphs of physics.
By providing the key to the underlying machinery of atomic structure it has
given an explanation for atomic spectra, for chemistry, and for the nature of
matter(1965, p. 18f).
These and similar claims by eminent scientists have generated a lot of mo-
mentum for the belief that chemistry is reducible to quantum physics. However,
there are serious problems with this belief. One example is that quantum me-
chanics does not allow the correct derivation of the periodic table (Löwdin 1969;
Scerri 1998, 1999). Another example is the problem of deriving the nonlinear
di¤erential equations of chemical kinetics from the linear Schrödinger equation
(Primas 1991, p. 163). Yet another example, which will be discussed in de-
tail below, is the problem of how molecular structure is related to quantum
mechanics, a problem rst recognized by Heisenberg (1930).
Beyond the relationship of chemistry to quantum mechanics there are ques-
tions as to reductionism even among theories in physics. For instance, it is a
fabled reductionist legend that thermodynamics can be reduced to lower-level
physics descriptions. Thermodynamical phases such as liquidity (e.g., of water)
cannot be strictly (i.e., without further assumptions) derived from the properties
of individual (e.g., H2O) molecules. Another example we discuss in more de-
tail below concerns the alleged reduction (Kemeny and Oppenheim 1956; Nagel
1961) of temperature as a thermodynamical property to the kinetic energy of
molecules.
The detailed discussion of these two examples will be used to exemplify
the sophisticated way in which properties at one level of description are often
related to properties at another level. While reductionists would argue that
both necessary and su¢ cient conditions for higher-level properties are already
present in the lower-level theory, it will be demonstrated that this is false in both
of these examples, and presumably false in many others as well. In other words,
there are properties of the higher-level theories (chemistry and thermodynamics)
for which the full arsenal of the fundamental theories (quantum mechanics and
statistical mechanics) provide no su¢ cient conditions for their derivation or
denition.
Our examples illustrate the signicance of a rarely discussed kind of inter-
level relation we call contextual property emergence. We propose this category
embedded in a framework classifying the relations between properties at dif-
ferent levels of description in section 2. It allows us to reconsider standard
characterizations of property emergence in the light of modern developments
in physics (sections 3 and 4). Guiding principles for contextual property emer-
gence will be emphasized in section 5, which might be helpful for applications
beyond physics. Specically, one may think of relations between di¤erent levels
of descriptions in brain physiology, e.g., relations between properties of neural
ensembles or populations and properties of individual neurons and synapses.
An even more ambitious application would be to the emergence of the mental
from the physical.
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2 Reduction and Emergence
Reduction and emergence are used in a variety of senses in the literature. For
the sake of simplicity, reduction and emergence schemes are typically organized
in a hierarchical manner, such that levels of description or levels of reality are
related to each other. As mentioned above, an analysis in terms of hierarchical
levels often oversimplies the picture. In general, non-hierarchical frameworks
including other notions such as those of domains of description or domains of
reality might be more appropriate.
As indicated by the distinction between levels of description and levels of
reality, there is a di¤erence between epistemological and ontological frameworks
for reduction and emergence. Broadly speaking, descriptive terms are usually
taken to be subjects of epistemological discourse while elements of reality are
usually taken to be subjects of ontological discourse. Both types of discourse
are used in reductionist and emergentist approaches. The concept of reference
establishes a connection between descriptive terms and described elements of
reality (leaving aside di¢ cult questions about reference itself).
The distinction between epistemological and ontological discourse is not suf-
cient to exhaust the di¤erent ways in which the notions of reduction and emer-
gence are used. In addition, it is also important to distinguish between di¤erent
types of features which are to be related to others. There are three main cat-
egories of relations: theories/laws to other theories/laws, properties to other
properties, and wholes to parts. Clearly, relations between theories/laws are
predominantly epistemological. The relation between wholes and parts, on the
other hand, is primarily conceived ontologically insofar as it refers to elements
of reality rather than their description. In the literature on property relations,
both epistemological and ontological frameworks can be found. Property rela-
tions are sometimes meant ontologically (i.e., regarding properties of elements
of reality) and sometimes epistemologically (i.e., regarding descriptive terms re-
ferring to properties of elements of reality). A standard candidate for discussing
epistemological theory relations is the relation between special relativity and
classical mechanics.
A standard candidate for discussing ontological part/whole relations is the
relation between molecules on the one hand and nuclei and electrons on the
other. A standard candidate for discussing ontological property relations is
the relationship between thermodynamic properties such as temperature and
mechanical properties such as momenta; its epistemological variant would be
the relationship between the descriptive terms referring to those properties. In
this essay, we will mainly focus on epistemological property relations: reduction
and emergence in the description of properties.1
In order to clearly distinguish between di¤erent concepts of reduction and
emergence, it is desirable to have a transparent classication scheme so that
their basic characteristics can be discussed coherently. A useful approach to-
1As the discussion in sections 3 and 4 will show, the relationships between properties at
di¤erent levels lead to nontrivial ontological questions. We will not address these here, since
their thorough discussion exceeds the scope of this essay.
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ward such a classication is based on the role which contingent contexts play
in reduction and emergence. More precisely, the way in which necessary and
su¢ cient conditions are assumed in the relation between di¤erent levels of de-
scription can be used to distinguish four classes of relations:
(1) The description of properties at a particular level of description (including
its laws) o¤ers both necessary and su¢ cient conditions to rigorously derive
the description of properties at a higher level. This is the strictest possible
form of reduction. As mentioned above, it was most popular under the
inuence of positivist thinking in the mid-20th century.
(2) The description of properties at a particular level of description (includ-
ing its laws) o¤ers necessary but not su¢ cient conditions to derive the
description of properties at a higher level. This version, which we propose
calling contextual emergence, indicates that contingent contextual condi-
tions are required in addition to the lower-level description for the rigorous
derivation of higher-level properties.
(3) The description of properties at a particular level of description (includ-
ing its laws) o¤ers su¢ cient but not necessary conditions to derive the
description of properties at a higher level. This version includes the idea
that a lower-level description o¤ers multiple realizations of a particular
property at a higher levela feature characteristic of supervenience.
(4) The description of properties at a particular level of description (including
its laws) o¤ers neither necessary nor su¢ cient conditions to derive the
description of properties at a higher level. This represents a form of radical
emergence insofar as there are no relevant conditions connecting the two
levels whatsoever.
Note that class (2) can complement class (3), so that it can be reasonable to
say that higher-level features both supervene on and emerge from lower-level
properties. This will be exemplied in section 4.2.
For obvious reasons, class (4) is unattractive if one is interested in explana-
tory relations between di¤erent levels of description. Non-reductive property
dualism (e.g., Davidson 1980) would be an example of radical emergence. By
contrast, class (1) is extremely appealing if one is interested in simple expla-
nations. So-called received viewsof reductionas Batterman (2002) refers to
themfall into this class. Unfortunately, many examples in the literature origi-
nally claimed to exemplify class (1) turn out to fail upon closer inspection (we
discuss two such examples in section 4). Hence, there are fewer advocates of
class (1) today, a notable exception being Kim (1998, 1999).
As far as Nagels (1961) inuential work on reduction is concerned, two
particular variants of his notion of reduction t into class (1). One of them
is sometimes called homogeneous reductionand reects the (trivial) case in
which the terms of the higher-level description are a subset of those of the
lower-level description. In heterogeneous reduction, there are connectability
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conditions (bridge laws) connecting the two levels. If these bridge laws are
contained in the lower-level description, the situation matches class (1). If this
is not the case, terms of the lower-level description may be either necessary (2)
or su¢ cient (3) for terms of the higher-level description.
In this sense, classes (2) and (3) are viable schemes for analyzing relation-
ships between di¤erent levels of description. Supervenience relations, generally
belonging to class (3),2 have been extensively discussed on the basis of Kims
proposals (Kim 1993).3 Interestingly, Kim himself has recently argued that
supervenience may be inadequate for capturing relations in the sciences (Kim
1998, 1999). This development has led to an emphasis on realization relations
(e.g., Kim 1998, 1999; Crook and Gillett 2000; Gillett 2002). In an epistemo-
logical interpretation, such relations fall into classes (1) - (3). Their ontological
implications remain unaddressed in the present essay.
In the remainder of this essay, we will focus our discussion on class (2), con-
textual property emergence, which is less rigid than the philosophical notion of
reduction on the one hand and provides more structure for interlevel relations
than radical emergence on the other. In some respects, one might interpret our
approach as representing a way of introducing e¤ective techniques for generat-
ing bridge laws within the framework of class (2), but we will not pursue this
viewpoint here. As will become clear below, our proposed scheme has much in
common with a notion of reduction which is di¤erent from its standard philo-
sophical meaning and has been distinguished as a physicist notion (Nickles 1973;
Batterman 2002, pp. 17-19).
A philosophers notion of property reduction, which attempts to specify
both necessary and su¢ cient conditions for ensuring the derivation of higher-
level properties from the lower-level description alone, falls into our class (1).
By contrast, the physicists notionof property reduction intends to specify the
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of some limit of an appropri-
ate parameter at the lower level, which leads to the introduction of higher-level
properties (e.g., the properties of a physical system in special relativity reduce
to their Newtonian mechanics counterparts in the limit v2=c2 ! 0, where v is
the system velocity and c is the speed of light in vacuum). If necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for the existence of the limit can be exhaustively specied
within the lower-level description (e.g., special relativity) alone, then the physi-
cists notion of reduction is analogous to our class (1). As we discuss in detail
below, however, the mentioned limit usually depends on conditions which can-
2Some versions of supervenience require that changes in lower-level descriptions of proper-
ties are both necessary and su¢ cient to bring about changes in a higher-level description of
properties. Such versions are indistinguishable from reduction (Kim 1998) and fall into class
(1).
3Recall that the British emergentists drew a distinction between resultant and emergent
properties (see, e.g., McLaughlin 1982; Gillett 2003). The model for a resultant property
was the process of vector addition of forces in classical particle mechanics, where the total
length and direction of a force vector is the sum of its components. Properties that could be
analyzed in such fashion were said to be resultant; they are reducible in the sense of class (1).
Properties unanalyzable in such fashion were said to be emergent but can potentially refer to
classes (2) - (4).
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not be exhaustively specied at the lower level. In order to delineate contextual
property emergence from other kinds of emergence, note that Kim (1999, pp.
19-22) characterizes the standard version of property emergence in terms of the
following four conditions:
(A) Emergent properties at a higher level arise out of properties and relations
characterizing the entities and properties at a lower level.
(B) Emergent properties are unpredictable, even given exhaustive information
concerning the lower level.
(C) Emergent properties are inexplicable/irreducible by/to lower-level prop-
erties.
(D) Emergent properties have novel causal properties irreducible to the causal
e¢ cacy of lower-level properties.
In the next section, where we sketch a formal way to represent contextual
property emergence, we will also analyze Kims conditions (A) - (D) in more
detail and demonstrate how they can be (re)formulated more precisely. As men-
tioned above, we will focus our attention on the epistemological interpretation
of these conditions.
3 Contextual Topologies and Asymptotic Expan-
sions
A rst precondition for achieving a formal relation between descriptions at dif-
ferent levels is a well-dened concept of states and properties of the system
considered at those levels. The algebraic approach in physics o¤ers just such
well-dened concepts. For example, in algebraic quantum theory, properties are
introduced as so-called observables forming a C-algebra4 A over the complex
numbers which is not commutative in general. The associated concept of a state
is introduced in terms of positive normalized linear functionals on A. The state
space of a fundamental theory in physics is chosen such that only the most basic
assumptions are required for its denition. In other words, the state space is
chosen as context-independent as possible. For instance, in quantum theory the
state space used to represent states is standardly taken to be a Hilbert space
endowed with the norm topology.
Contexts are contingent conditions referring to the degree of abstraction
at which a theoretical framework is formulated. Each description requires ab-
stracting from,meaning disregarding those details of a given system (and its
environment) which are to be considered irrelevant. Needless to say, declar-
ing particular features as irrelevant is not a universally prescribed procedure,
4A -algebra is an algebra admitting an involution  : A ! A with the usual properties.
A -algebra is normed, if there is a mapping jj:jj : A ! R+ with the usual properties. A
complete normed -algebra is a Banach -algebra. A C-algebra is a Banach -algebra A with
the additional property jjxxjj = jjxjj2 for all x 2 A (see Takesaki 2002, chap. I.1).
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but must be tailored to particular purposes or interests. Features which are
irrelevant in a particular context may be highly relevant in another.
For instance, temperature is an example of a feature that is relevant in ther-
modynamics but irrelevant in Newtonian or statistical mechanics. Light rays
are relevant in geometric optics, but they are irrelevant in Maxwells electrody-
namics. The chirality of molecules is relevant in physical chemistry, but it is
irrelevant in a Schr¨odinger-type quantum mechanical description. Nevertheless,
there are strategies for implementing the contexts due to which temperature is
relevant in thermodynamics, due to which rays are relevant in geometric optics,
and due to which chirality is relevant in physical chemistry, at the level of sta-
tistical mechanics, of electrodynamics, and of quantum mechanics, respectively.
A natural way to represent contexts of these kinds is the modication of the
original topology of the lower-level state space into a contextual topology (Pri-
mas 1998). The nest topology corresponds to the most fundamental context,
e.g. given by rst principles,and coarser topologies5 represent an increasing
amount of contextual information not encoded in rst principles.6 The key idea
of relating properties at di¤erent levels of description to each other is to spec-
ify the di¤erence between the descriptions in terms of the topologies of their
corresponding state spaces.
Implementing a particular set of contexts as a contextual topology is usually
nontrivial. A powerful tool often used for this purpose are asymptotic expan-
sions (see Friedrichs 1955; Dingle 1973; Berry 1994; Batterman 2002). In order
to formulate such an expansion, a reference state, which represents essential
features of the context, has to be specied in the lower-level state space of the
fundamental description. Examples for such reference states are Kubo-Martin-
Schwinger (KMS) states in statistical mechanics or electronic ground states of
a molecule in quantum chemistry.
If the expansion is singular, it is not uniformly convergent in the intrinsic,
ne topology of the fundamental description as an appropriate parameter tends
to some limit. This discontinuous limiting behavior indicates the need for a
change of topology. Examples for such parameters are the number of degrees
of freedom for thermodynamics (thermodynamic limit), the wavelength for geo-
metric optics (short-wavelength limit), or the electron mass divided by nuclear
mass for physical chemistry (Born-Oppenheimer limit).
The crucial point then is to identify a new topology which regularizes the
expansion such that it converges. Such a regularization is often possible by
introducing a hierarchy of separable time scales, and then considering the motion
of the system on fast time scales relative to almost xed reference states
according to slowtime scales (for examples see Batterman 2002; Primas 1998).
The separation of time scales leads to a coarser, contextual topology of the
5Consider the set of points 
 and a closure function which assigns to each set '  
 a set
'  
 (called the closure of ') satisfying the properties '  ', ' [  = ' [  ,  = , and
' = '. A topology with the closure function ' ! ' is ner than that given by the closure
function '! '0, if '  '0 for each '  
. The topology is coarser if '  '0 for each '  
.
6A powerful example of a rst principle is symmetry. A detailed discussion of the relation
between Primasapproach and symmetry principles has been given by Mainzer (1996).
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state space (see, e.g., Schulman and Gaveau 2001) providing a partition into
equivalence classes of states. The new, coarser topology is compatible with the
original, ner topology if they (in particular, their dynamics) are topologically
equivalent with each other. However, the contextual topology is contingent in
the sense that it is not given by the original ner topology or any other elements
of the fundamental theory. The description in the coarser, contextual topology
allows us to dene new context-dependent features (novel properties) of a higher-
level description that are not dened in the original state space under the ner
topology (cf. Primas 1998; Schulman and Gaveau 2001).
The procedure described so far represents a formal approach for a contex-
tual emergence of higher-level properties on the basis of contexts in addition
to the terms of the lower-level description. Qualitatively new, emergent prop-
erties, unavailable in the lower-level description, manifest themselves within
the higher-level description. In somewhat less technical terms, the new state
space is coarse-grained in a way allowing the denition of new (symbolic) states,
together with associated observables, represented by the cells of its partition
(cf. beim Graben 2004; Gaveau and Schulman 2005; Atmanspacher and beim
Graben forthcoming). In this terminology, the choice of a proper partition is
not prescribed at the lower-level description, but depends on the purpose of the
partitioning and is usually based on properties that are foreign to the lower-level
description. This is, for example, the core idea in the construction of a symbolic
dynamics within the theory of dynamical systems (see Lind and Marcus 1995;
beim Graben 2004).
Invoking a new contextual topology, then, accommodates novel properties
as such within a higher-level description rather than approximating them as a
limiting case in the topology of a lower-level description. It is important to
realize that the task of higher level descriptions is not to approximate the
fundamental theory but to represent new patterns (Primas 1998, p. 87). In
general, these patterns are not reducible to a more fundamental level in the strict
sense of class (1). Such reducibility would mean that only the rst principles of
the fundamental description are needed to describe new patterns exhaustively.
If higher-level contexts in addition to rst principles must be considered in
order to rigorously derive descriptions of these new patterns so that reduction
according to class (1) fails.
In such cases, contexts are at least as important as rst principles. Given
the fundamental theory and a suitable contextual topology, novel properties can
be rigorously derived using asymptotic expansions that are regularized in the
new contextual topology. Such higher-level descriptions in general cannot be
considered as sub-descriptions of the fundamental theory because that theory
alone does not imply the new contextual topology. In this sense we suggest
considering emergent properties within class (2) of the proposed classication
scheme. The contextual emergence of such properties can be physically well
motivated and made mathematically rigorous via contextual topologies. Clearly,
then, condition (A) above must be understood such that emergent properties
arise from lower-level properties if a new contextual topology, not specied by
the lower level theory, is additionally introduced. While necessary conditions for
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emergent properties exist at the lower level, the su¢ cient conditions represented
by contexts do not exist at the lower level.
With respect to condition (B), emergent properties cannot be predicted from
the lower level alone, even if exhaustive information concerning this level is as-
sumed. Only the lower-level description plus the appropriate contextual topol-
ogy renders emergent properties predictable as elements of a new algebra of
observables. Similarly for condition (C): although even exhaustive information
concerning the lower-level properties cannot yield an explanation of emergent
properties, the emergence of new properties can be completely explained if the
appropriate contextual topology is taken into account. This is at variance with
the received view of explanation as exemplied by Hempel (1965).
Regarding condition (D), some further elaboration is necessary. Kim and
others have argued that if new causal powers emerge at a higher level not
reducible to or realized by lower-level properties, then we are left with at best a
mystery as to where such powerscome from or, at worst, the causal closure of
the physical is violated (e.g. Kim 1998, 54-5; van Gulick 2001). As a rst com-
ment, the term causal poweris somewhat vague, perhaps because the intuitive
notion associated with this term is too imprecise or may be too broad. One may
therefore prefer to speak about properties acting as constraints to bring about
e¤ects (causal e¢ cacy). Second, since the new contextual topology allows for
the prediction and explanation of emergent properties, based on a physically
well-motivated new algebra of observables associated with the new contextual
topology, the causal e¢ cacy of these properties is considerably demystied and
may even become intelligible (see below).
A reductionist might object that lower-level descriptions in fact provide
derivable and predictable higher-level properties, albeit through very sophis-
ticated, complex mathematical manipulations. For example Kim argues that
the issue of whether a higher-level property is predictable from the lower level
surely does not turn on when the mathematical relation between the two levels
is simple rather than complex (Kim 1999, pp. 7-8). So one might worry that the
level of mathematical sophistication involved in asymptotic analysis is somehow
obscuring the reductive relations between the various levels, meaning that there
is no need to relax the assumption of an absoluteontology.
However, although asymptotic analysis is indeed sophisticated and complex,
this objection misses the crucial point of asymptotic reasoning. Sophisticated
mathematics alone is insu¢ cient to yield the asymptotic models and theories
of one level from those of another for the examples we discuss. In addition,
a suitably modied new contextual topology is required that is not given by
the lower level, but must be implemented based on the context of the consid-
ered situation. As described above, there is a general systematic framework
for dening a contingent contextual topology and then using that new topology
along with the fundamental theory to rigorously derive a new, higher-level de-
scription. The crucial point is that the specic contextual topology needed to
introduce emergent properties depends on contexts not given by the lower-level
description. In contrast to radical emergence as in class (4), the contextual
properties of higher-level descriptions emerge in a well-dened manner rather
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than magically out of nowhere.
Our approach shares some similarities with Battermans (2002) recent ac-
count of asymptotic emergence. He also indicates that conditions (A) - (C)
must be suitably rened to understand how lower-level or rst principlesde-
scriptions play their role in the prediction and explanation of emergent prop-
erties. While Batterman emphasizes the no mans land in the asymptotic
region between theories (2002, pp. 115-120), we emphasize the role of contex-
tual topologies in the prediction and explanation of emergent properties. As
a more substantial point of di¤erence, Batterman explicitly suggests restrict-
ing the discussion about emergent causal properties (condition (D)) to the role
emergent properties play in asymptotic explanations (2002, pp. 126-29). In
our judgment, this is a severe limitation that leaves important topics central
to the debates unaddressed (e.g., how causal properties arise, why they are ro-
bust and e¢ cacious, etc.). Our view allows for discussion of possible forms of
downward causation and causal autonomy of emergent properties with respect
to lower-level properties (see below).
4 Examples
This section discusses two examples of contextual emergence in a way which is
detailed enough to see how contexts can be introduced leading to contextual
topologies and emergent properties. Moreover, it is shown how necessary condi-
tions for the emergence of novel properties are related to lower-level descriptions,
whereas contingent contexts, not available within the lower-level description,
represent su¢ cient conditions leading to well-dened properties at higher-order
levels of description.7
4.1 Molecular Structure and Chirality
An essential ingredient of molecular physics and chemistry is the concept of
molecular structure (shape, or gestalt), i.e. the conguration of the nuclei
of the molecule. It is impossible to derive molecular structure from quan-
tum mechanical rst principles alone because in a complete quantum mechan-
ical description electrons and nuclei are in entangled states. At the level of
Schrödingers equation, systems which di¤er by their molecular structure alone
cannot be distinguished. A well-known example is di¤erent enantiomeric species
of chiral molecules, whose chirality (handedness) is not a relevant observable at
the level of quantum mechanics. Chirality is a classical observable, i.e., it is
not an element of the algebra of observables of standard quantum mechanics
(cf. Amann 1988).
As Woolley points out, the systematic application of quantum mechanics to
a molecule does not lead ... to the usual, and undoubtedly essentially correct,
description of chemical phenomena that is obtained from orthodox quantum
7See Primas (1998) for more details and additional illustrative examples.
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chemistry (1976, p. 31). The common reductionist argument for this fail-
ure is that the application of the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics to
molecular systems leads to equations too complicated to solve; therefore, ap-
proximations are developed that supposedly stand in for the fundamental
equations.8 However, this argument is inappropriate. The approaches used in
quantum chemistry cannot be directly derived from fundamental equations of
quantum physics, but, rather, appear to be strategies and solutions correspond-
ing to di¤erent equations, where new concepts which cannot be inferred from
the underlying fundamental laws are required(Woolley 1976, p. 32). Molecular
structure is just such a concept and plays a crucial role in molecular physics and
chemistry.
The concept of molecular structure has a long history (cf. Mainzer 1997). It
was rst precisely dened by Born and Oppenheimer (1927) through the famous
so-called Born-Oppenheimer approximation.Mathematically it represents an
expansion in the parameter  = (me=mn)
1
4 ! 0, where me is the electron mass
and mn is the nuclear mass. In this limit the correlations among nuclei and
electrons are suppressed and molecular structure can be addressed. Physically
the limit  ! 0 represents a stability condition, where the electronic motion
takes place against the background of a xed nuclear frame. (Similarly, this can
be achieved in the adiabatic approximationin which electrons are considered
to move much faster than the nuclear frame of a molecule.) Nuclear permuta-
tion and rotational symmetries of the Hamiltonian at the fundamental level of
Schrödingers equation are also suppressed in the limit  ! 0 (Woolley 1976,
p. 34). For a chemical level of discussion, such symmetries are inapplicable.
Chemists typically measure systems in mixed states which lack these symme-
tries.
With respect to molecular structure, no amount of computational investi-
gation of the full molecular Schrödinger equation could lead to, for example,
the familiar chemical idea of ammonia as a pyramidal molecule which is invert-
ing, because the two modes of description have nothing in common(Woolley
1976, p. 32). This is to say that the fundamental description does not capture
crucial features of molecules. In the light of these facts, the Born-Oppenheimer
approximation is more than a mere mathematical manipulation. It replaces
the basic quantum description with a new description generated by the singu-
lar limit  ! 0. This replacement corresponds to a change in the algebra of
observables needed for the description of molecular phenomenaa change which
yields chirality as a classical observable related to molecular structure (see, e.g.,
Primas 1983, pp. 335-341; Amann 1993).
Using the terminology of Section 3, the asymptotic expansion ! 0 denes a
context required to change the norm topology of the basic quantum mechanical
Hilbert space description into a new contextual topology. Molecular structure
involves classical observables (i.e., commuting variables) expressible in the new
contextual topology, but not expressible in the original norm topology. In the
conceptual framework of Section 2, this contextual topology, together with the
8This line of argument has been called the proxy defenseby Hendry (1998).
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lower-level quantum mechanical description, represents su¢ cient conditions for
the description of molecular structure which are not available under the origi-
nal topology. However, the new contextual topology is a contingent condition,
being implied by neither standard quantum theory nor the original norm topol-
ogy. In order to construct the appropriate contextual topology, one must rst
know what the appropriate observables are. In the case of molecular structure,
the appropriate classical observables are not elements of the original algebra of
observables given by the fundamental theory. There are no classical observables
in standard formulations of quantum mechanics, so these observables must be
specied in terms of an additional context beyond the basic Hilbert space de-
scription. Once the new contextual topology is in place, the asymptotic expan-
sion can be regularized and molecular phenomena can be accurately described
(cf. Primas 1998). The appropriate contextual topology together with standard
quantum mechanics then allows the rigorous derivation of molecular properties
like structure. Necessary conditions due to the original topology of the basic
description are not violated as the new contextual topology is consistent with
(though not implied by) the original topology.
To put things another way, as pointed out a complete Schrödinger-level de-
scription of molecules would involve correlations between nuclei and electrons,
nuclear permutation and rotation symmetries, and an algebra of observables
lacking the classical observables relevant to molecular structure. Given these
features of the theory, standard quantum mechanics neither predicts nor ex-
plains structural properties of real molecules. The laws and properties of the
standard theory are insu¢ cient to yield molecular structure, minimize the corre-
lations, break the symmetries and modify the algebra of observables. A rigorous
description of molecular structure may emerge at the chemical level of descrip-
tion when a suitable contextual topology is provided. They key point is that
such a contextual topology is not given or implied by fundamental quantum
mechanics since such a new topology is absent. The theory makes no claims
about molecular structure. At most it can supply necessary conditions for the
description of these features of real molecules. This is precisely the conceptual
scheme of contextual emergence, where the emergent property is the chiral (or
other) structure of a molecule.
Such emergent properties can act in a way that is neither contained in, nor
derivable from, nor predicted by the fundamental quantum description alone.
Although one might think of them as merely descriptiveterms, they have real
consequences which suggest some ontological signicance for them. For exam-
ple, molecular structure and chirality are crucial for the explanation of optical
activity where particular materials, optical isomers, rotate plane-polarized light
passing through it (Woolley 1976, p. 32). They are invoked in typical descrip-
tions and interpretations of single biomolecule spectroscopy (Weiss 1999) and
in the nanomechanical properties of molecules (Gimzewski and Joachim 1999;
Smith et al. 1999). And they play a crucial role in understanding DNA, various
diseases and medications (e.g., DeCamp 1989; Avertisov et al. 1991). Further-
more, molecular structure is important for chemical and biological self-assembly
(e.g. Lehn 2002; Whitesides and Grzybowski 2002).
13
Additionally, the asymptotic expansion ! 0 leads to a description of mole-
cular dynamics with a hierarchy of time scales. While terms proportional to 
and 3 vanish, terms proportional to 2 characterize vibrations of the nuclear
frame and terms proportional to 4 characterize rotations of the nuclear frame.
This hierarchy is related to time-scale separations providing the basis for molec-
ular spectroscopy. Electronic spectra are characterized by the time scale 0  t,
while vibrational spectra are characterized by the slower time scale 2  2t
and rotational spectra are characterized by the even slower time scale 4  4t.
An interesting feature of this hierarchy is that adjacent levels are connected by
feedback loops such that each lower level is subordinated to the next higher
level. In this way, higher-level behavior constrains lower-level behavior. This
concept is at variance with traditional reductive hierarchies but can be discussed
in the context of downward causation.
A recent example of such downward causation in the formation of chiral
molecules has recently been reported by Ribó et al. (2001). Typically, in the
absence of external polarization or other inuences, the orientation of chiral
molecules is governed by random uctuations with both orientations arising
equally likely. However, using particular aqueous solutions far from thermo-
dynamic equilibrium, Ribó et al. showed that stirringa macroscopic process
changes the random distribution of orientations of chiral molecules. This can
be described as a special type of symmetry breaking. In this sense, higher-level
constraints inuence the dynamics of molecular formation at a lower level. In
other words, molecular structure can be inuenced by operations at higher-order
levels. In this context, one might have the general worry that there is a potential
problem for causal exclusion or paradox. However, this problem arises only if
one assumes that the causal e¢ cacy of the lower-level description is exhaustive
of all lower-level properties. This assumption is too strong, however. The dy-
namical equations of lower-level theories like quantum mechanics always require
the addition of particular global constraints (often in the form of boundary con-
ditions) in order either to form a well-posed problem or to remove degeneracies
(i.e., the multiplicity of possible solutions). These constraints are usually not
given at the lower level. In the experiments of Ribó et al. (2001), macroscopic
constraints have downward causal e¤ects on the formation of chiral molecules.
In this example, higher-level constraints provided by the stability condition aris-
ing from the Born-Oppenheimer procedure remove degrees of freedom existing
in the dynamical equations at the lower level, addressing the combinations of
electrons and nuclei (such combinations are under determined by Schrödingers
equation).
4.2 Thermal Equilibrium and Temperature
A second, much discussed example is the reduction or emergence, respectively, of
thermodynamic properties such as temperature to or from properties at lower-
level descriptions. Although there are various approaches to discussing this
issue (e.g. Haken 1983; Glansdor¤ and Prigogine 1971), we will focus on an
algebraic reconstruction of the emergence of thermodynamic properties. The
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reason is that this point of view allows us to pose the problems in a way which
is conceptually transparent (though mathematically involved; see section 3).
The usual candidates of lower-level descriptions in this context are statistical
mechanics and point mechanics. How are these levels of description related to
thermodynamics?
To start with the less controversial issue, the step from point mechanics
to statistical mechanics is essentially based on the formation of an ensemble
distribution. This is to say that particular properties of a system are dened in
terms of a statistical ensemble description (e.g., as moments of a many-particle
distribution function) which refers to the state of an ensemble rather than to
states of single particles in an individual description.
An example is the mean kinetic energy of a system of N particles, which
can be calculated from the distribution of the momenta of all particles. The
expectation value of kinetic energy is dened in the limit of innitely many
particles, assuming the applicability of the usual limit theorems such as the law
of large numbers. Any expectation value of a thermodynamic property (includ-
ing temperature) whose denition is based on a statistical ensemble description
presupposes (innitely) many degrees of freedom, i.e., the thermodynamic limit
N !1.
The more controversial issue in discussing the reduction or emergence of
temperature refers to the step from statistical mechanics to thermodynamics
(cf. the discussion by Compagner 1989). It amounts to relating the expectation
value of a momentum distribution of a many-particle ensemble to the temper-
ature of the system as a whole. In many philosophical discussions it is argued
that the thermodynamic temperature of a gas is the mean kinetic energy of
the molecules which by hypothesis constitute the gas (Nagel 1961, p. 341).
This statement suggests a fairly straightforward reduction of thermodynamic
temperature to statistical mechanics.
Such a rough picture, however, would be a gross mischaracterization, based
on a too generous treatment of some important details. In addition to the
thermodynamic limit, thermodynamic descriptions presume thermodynamic, or
briey thermal, equilibrium as a crucial assumption which is neither formally
nor conceptually available at the level of statistical mechanics. Moreover, the
very concept of temperature is fundamentally foreign to statistical mechanics
and has to be introduced, e.g., on the basis of phenomenological arguments.9
Thermal equilibrium is formulated by the zeroth law of thermodynamics: if
two systems are both in thermal equilibrium with a third system, then they
are said to be in thermal equilibrium with each other. (In this sense, the de-
nition of temperature is relational.) Based on this equivalence relation, the
phenomenological concept of temperature can be introduced in the usual text-
book way. Since thermal equilibrium is not dened at the level of statistical
mechanics, temperature is not a mechanical property but, rather, emerges as
a novel property at the level of thermodynamics. In this sense, the concept of
9We do not discuss the phenomenological signicance of the concept of temperature in
terms of phenomenally experienced qualities of warmor cold,which may also be consid-
ered in this context.
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thermal equilibrium serves as a context providing conditions for a proper discus-
sion of temperature. This context is available at the higher-level description of
thermodynamics. It can be recast in terms of a class of distinguished statistical
states, the so-called Kubo-Martin-Schwinger (KMS) states, at the lower-level
statistical description. These states are dened by the KMS condition, which
characterizes the stability of a KMS state against local perturbations. The KMS
condition essentially implements a higher-level context, the zeroth law of ther-
modynamics, in terms of a stability condition at the lower level of statistical
mechanics. The second law of thermodynamics expresses this stability condi-
tion in terms of a maximization of entropy. (Equivalently, the free energy of the
system is minimal in thermal equilibrium.) If a system is in a KMS state, then
this state is the canonical Gibbs state, uniquely dening a parameter interpreted
as a (inverse) temperature.10
In the framework of an algebraic statistical mechanics description, KMS
states serve as reference states for a Gelfand-Naimark-Segal (GNS) construc-
tion. Such reference states are functionals on a fundamental, lower-level, algebra
of observables. They induce a new, contextual topology in the state space of
statistical mechanics, which is coarser than the original topology and gives rise
to another, higher-level algebra of observables including thermodynamic tem-
perature as a property of the system. It has been shown in detail by Takesaki
(1970) how temperature emerges as a classical observable from an underlying
quantum statistical description.11 Temperature is then an element of an alge-
braM of contextual observables, where the context is introduced by the KMS
state as a reference state plus the contextual topology induced by this reference
state. Since mechanical descriptions are given by type I W -algebras and the
contextual W -algebra M is of type III,12 temperature cannot be an element
of a mechanical description (Primas 1998). Hence, temperature is not reducible
to statistical mechanics in any straightforward sense.
Thermodynamic temperature is an example of a contextually emergent prop-
erty, which is neither contained in nor predicted by the exhaustive lower-level
mechanical description alone. However, given the lower-level mechanical de-
scription and an appropriate contextual topology (based on the KMS state),
thermodynamic quantities can be rigorously derived. Again, the contextual
topology is a contingent condition not implied by the lower-level theory with
the original topology as neither the concepts of thermal equilibrium nor of KMS
10For more details concerning the conceptual signicance of the KMS condition see Sewell
(2002, chap. 5). The stability requirement imposed by the KMS condition is discussed in
detail in Atmanspacher and beim Graben (2006).
11Another thermodynamical concept, which is based on the KMS condition in a similar way,
is the chemical potential. It has been shown that chemical potential emerges as a classical
observable from an underlying quantum statistical description as well (Müller-Herold 1980).
12A W -algebra is a -algebra which is isomorphic to a closed algebra of observables on a
Hilbert space. A C-algebraM is a W -algebra if and only if it is the dual of a Banach space
M, where M is the predual of M (see Takesaki 2002, Chap. III.3). W -algebrs can be
classied by their central decompositions, i.e.~by factors. A factor is of type I if it contains
an atom. It is of type III if it does not contain any nonzero nite projection. It is of type II
if it is atom-free and contains some nonzero nite projection. For more details see Takesaki
2002, p. 296).
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states are applicable at the lower level. This is precisely the conceptual scheme
of contextual emergence, where the emergent property is the temperature (or
other thermal features) of thermodynamics.
At this point let us emphasize that the contextual emergence of temperature
does not exclude or contradict the possibility of conceiving temperature as su-
pervenient. As supervenience is based on su¢ cient conditions at the lower-level
description, it takes into account that di¤erent statistical mixtures (distribu-
tions) of particles can be considered as multiple realizations of a thermal state
with the same temperature. The notion of contextual emergence addresses the
question of how statistical properties are related to thermal properties for each
individual statistical realization. Contextual emergence does not address issues
of multiple realization but tries to elucidate principles which allow us to under-
stand interlevel relations in each individual instantiation in a conceptually clear
manner.
If crucial contextual details are not disregarded, one may even conceive of
properties that can act as constraints for lower-level properties, emerging at
higher levels of physical descriptions. For example, the behavior of individual
particles may be constrained by the collective behavior of a many-particle system
as a whole, e.g., described at the level of thermodynamics (see Bishop 2004,
section 6).
5 Guiding Principles for Contextual Emergence
After the detailed discussion of the emergent properties of chirality and tem-
perature as examples for contextual emergence, it is worthwhile addressing its
key features. Repeating the general characterization given in section 2: the
description of properties (and laws) at a particular level of description o¤ers
necessary but not su¢ cient conditions to derive properties at a higher level
of description. In logical terms, the necessity of conditions at the lower level
of description means that components of the higher level of description imply
components of the lower level of description. The converse does not hold in
contextual emergence, as the the lower-level description does not o¤er su¢ cient
conditions for the derivation of higher-level components Additional, contingent
conditions specifying the context for the transition from the lower to the higher
level of description are required in order to provide such su¢ cient conditions.
In the example of chirality, the notion of molecular structure is the key con-
text. Molecular structure is not available at a fundamental quantum mechan-
ical level of description. Using the Born-Oppenheimer expansion as a context,
i.e., considering the limit (me=mn)
1
4 ! 0, chirality can be obtained as an emer-
gent property at the level of molecular descriptions. Mathematically speaking,
this limit converges in the framework of a molecular description and leads to
new, contextual properties, including chirality. Physically speaking, the con-
vergence of the limit corresponds to a stability criterion establishing a nuclear
frame with respect to which the motion of the electrons can be considered as
separated. Since the quantum mechanical level of description is necessary to
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derive the higher-level property of chirality, quantum mechanical principles or
laws cannot be violated by any higher-level description incorporating chirality.
That the quantum mechanical level of description alone is not su¢ cient is recog-
nized by the fact that it does not give rise to an algebra of observables including
chirality unless additional contingent conditions are given.
In the example of temperature, the notion of thermal equilibrium is the
key context. Thermal equilibrium is not available at the level of description of
Newtonian or statistical mechanics. Implementing thermal equilibrium in terms
of the KMS condition and considering the limit !1 at the level of statistical
mechanics, temperature can be obtained as an emergent property at the level of
a thermodynamical description. Mathematically speaking, this limit converges
in the framework of a thermodynamical description and leads to new, contextual
properties, including temperature. Physically speaking, the convergence of the
limit corresponds to a stability criterion for KMS states which is induced by the
contextual condition of thermal equilibrium at the level of thermodynamics and
implemented at the level of statistical mechanics.
Since the Newtonian and statistical mechanical levels of description are nec-
essary to derive the high-level property of temperature, principles or laws of
these levels of description cannot be violated by any higher-level description in-
corporating temperature. That the Newtonian and statistical mechanical levels
of description alone are not su¢ cient is recognized by the fact that they do not
give rise to an algebra of observables including temperature unless additional
contingent contexts are specied and properly implemented.
The signicance of contextual emergence as opposed to reduction in the
discussed examples is clear. Of course, it would be interesting to extend the
general construction scheme for emergent properties to other cases. More phys-
ical examples are indicated and discussed, for example, in Primas (1998) and
Batterman (2002). We propose the concept of stability as a key principle for the
construction of a contextual topology and an associated algebra of contextual
observables in examples beyond physics.
One possible, and ambitious, case refers to emergent properties in the frame-
work of cognitive neuroscience. A particularly active eld of research here is
concerned with the emergence of new properties at the level of neural ensem-
bles from lower-level properties of individual neurons. Particular interest in
this issue derives from the fact that cognitive capabilities are usually correlated
with the activity of neural ensembles, but detailed neurobiological knowledge
refers mainly to the properties of individual neurons. Closing the gap in our
understanding of the relation between properties of neural ensembles and indi-
vidual neurons could contribute signicantly to understanding neurobiological
correlates of consciousness.
As a possible framework for research in this area, the scheme of contextual
emergence, as exemplied in the previous section, might be fruitfully applied as
follows. Novel properties at the (higher) level of neural ensembles would have
necessary but not su¢ cient conditions at the (lower) level of neurons. In order
to identify contexts providing such su¢ cient conditions, those among the many
possible ensemble properties which are relevant or interesting as emergent prop-
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erties must rst be claried. Assuming that stability criteria and associated
time scales play a role analogous to physical examples, techniques of nonlinear
dynamics for modeling ensembles in terms of attractors with particular stabil-
ity properties and relaxation times or escape times suggest themselves. This
can be implemented easily for powerful modeling tools such as neural networks
(Anderson and Rosenfeld 1989) or coupled map lattices (Kaneko and Tsuda
2000).
Contextual emergence might even be a viable scheme for addressing rela-
tions between the neurobiology of the brain at various levels, on the one hand,
and cognitive or psychological features, on the otherin other words, address-
ing the relation between material (brain) and mental (consciousness) features.
In another paper (Atmanspacher and beim Graben forthcoming) a number of
corresponding aspects of cognitive neuroscience have been worked out in detail
recently.
In that approach, mental states are considered to emerge from neural states
by partitioning the neural state space. Well-dened mental states provide con-
texts inducing a criterion of structural stability for the neurodynamics which
can be implemented by particular partitions and analyzed in terms of symbolic
dynamics. These stability criteria are applied to the discussion of neural cor-
relates of consiousness, to the denition of macroscopic neural states, and to
aspects of the symbol grounding problem. In particular, it is shown that mental
descriptions that are topologically equivalent to the neurodynamical description
emerge if the partition of the neural phase space is generating.
6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
The goal of epistemological property reduction is to derive the description of
higher-level properties exhaustively in terms of the description of properties
at the most fundamental level of physical theory, no matter how remote these
higher-level properties are from that most fundamental level. The implicit as-
sumption in this program is that the description of all properties which are not
included at the fundamental level can be constructed or derived from this level.
The concept and the examples discussed in this essay pose serious di¢ culties
for this program. Molecular structure is a novel property emerging from a more
fundamental quantum mechanical description, but it is not derivable from the
lower-level description alone.
Similarly, temperature is a novel property emerging from a more fundamen-
tal statistical mechanical description, but it is likewise not derivable from the
lower-level description alone. The concept of contextual emergence addresses
such situations properly. Contextual emergence is characterized by the fact
that the description of lower-level properties provides necessary, but not su¢ -
cient conditions for the description of higher-level properties. The presence of
necessary conditions indicates that the lower-level description provides a basis
for higher-level descriptions, while the absence of su¢ cient conditions means
that higher-level properties are neither logical consequences of the lower-level
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description nor can such properties be rigorously derived from the lower-level
description alone.
Hence, the notion of strong reduction is inapplicable in these cases. Su¢ cient
conditions for a rigorous derivation of higher-level properties can be introduced
through specifying contexts reecting the particular kinds of contingency in a
given situation. These contexts can be implemented as stability criteria in the
lower-level description and induce a change in the topology of the corresponding
state space (e.g., due to coarse-graining). There is, then, a mathematically
well-dened procedure for deriving higher-level properties given the lower level
description plus the contingent contextual conditions.
A key ingredient of this procedure is the denition of some type of stability
condition (e.g., the KMS condition) based on considerations required to establish
the framework of a higher-level description (e.g., thermal equilibrium). This
condition is typically implemented as a reference state with respect to which an
asymptotic expansion is singular in the lower-level state space. Its regularization
denes a novel, contextual topology in which novel, emergent properties can
be rigorously introduced. In the thermodynamic example, this procedure is
represented by the GNS-construction.
Contextual property emergence and the associated identication of appropri-
ate stability conditions may have applications in other domains such as biology
and psychology, and, ultimately, in the relationship between the mental and
the physical. For example, debates in the philosophy of mind discuss the phys-
ical either as being both necessary and su¢ cient (reduction) or as being only
su¢ cient (supervenience) for the mental. Contextual emergence is located be-
tween those two positions. As worked out in detail elsewhere (Atmanspacher
and beim Graben 2006), it attenuates reductive claims and complements (rather
than contradicts) particular ideas about the supervenience of the mental on the
physical.
Examples of contextual property emergence such as those discussed here
can serve as models for generalizations concerning ideas related to ontological
relativity and downward causation in broader contexts. Both notions have been
addressed in recent work (Atmanspacher and Kronz 1999; Ribó et al. 2001;
Bishop 2004), and they have been illustrated for examples from physics and
chemistry. Eventually such a line of investigation might yield steps toward a
better understanding of how mind can emerge in and have an inuence on a
physical world.
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